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ABSTRACT 
 
We investigate the relationship between corporate board of directors’ attributes and conditional 
accounting conservatism in the French context. Using a pooled regression model over the period 
2009-2012, our empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, greater board activity 
encourages more conservative reporting in financial statements. Second, larger board size 
diminishes conditional accounting conservatism. Lastly, there is a positive association between 
gender diversity and accounting conservatism. As a robustness test, we use alternative measures 
of accounting conservatism, namely time series and accrual-based measures in addition to 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Our findings suggest that boards of directors’ attributes are an 
important factor in determining the financial reporting quality of French firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he recent spate of accounting scandals such as those surrounding Enron, WorldCom and Tyco have 
shaken investor confidence in financial reports. In an attempt to enhance the credibility of reporting, 
regulators, practitioners, and academics have worked to develop more sophisticated accounting 
practices. A growing body of research encourages the use of conservative reporting practices. Traditionally, 
accounting conservatism is defined by the adage “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses” (Bliss, 1924). This 
implies that losses will be identified much sooner, while the recognition of profit is postponed until gains are 
realized. Recently, alternative definitions have emerged. For example, in the pioneering study conducted by Basu 
(1997), accounting conservatism is defined as “the accountant’s tendency to require a higher degree of verification 
to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses”. Ryan (2006) states that conditional 
accounting conservatism involves firms writing down the book value of net assets in a timely fashion upon receiving 
sufficiently bad news, but not writing up net assets as quickly upon receiving correspondingly good news. Such 
accounting leads to an asymmetric timeliness in recognition of good news vs. bad news. This asymmetric timeliness 
of recognition is also referred to as conditional accounting conservatism, ex-post conservatism, news dependent, 
income statement conservatism, or earnings conservatism (see e.g. Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). In accounting literature, there is a distinction between conditional and unconditional accounting 
conservatism. Unconditional accounting conservatism refers to the persistent understatement of shareholders’ equity 
due to routinely biased accounting rules, independent of contemporaneous economic news (see e.g. Felthman and 
Ohlson, 1995; Garcia Lara and Mora, 2004; Beaver and Ryan, 2005; Ryan, 2006). This type of conservatism is 
known as ex-ante conservatism, news independent or balance sheet conservatism. In this study, we only focus on 
conditional accounting conservatism based on the evidence of Garcia Lara et al. (2009) that conditional accounting 
conservatism plays an important role in corporate governance. Prior studies have identified four main causes for the 
existence of accounting conservatism, and all of them concur in highlighting that conservatism is helpful to financial 
statement users. First, accounting conservatism emerges as a part of an efficient contracting mechanism. Many 
contracts between firms and their various parties make use of accounting conservatism in financial statements. 
T 
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Current accounting studies show that accounting conservatism benefits boards of directors, investors, less informed 
shareholders, and debt-holders, among other concerned parties. For instance, it allows boards of directors to detect 
negative net present value projects early on1 (Ball, 2001), and increase future investment opportunities (Garcia Lara 
et al., 2009). Since accounting conservatism limits managers’ opportunistic behaviour (Watts, 2003; Kwon et al., 
2001 and Chen et al., 2007), conservatism helps reduce earnings manipulation (Watts, 2003) and increase firm value 
(Watts and Zuo, 2012). Lafond and Watts (2008) argue that accounting conservatism reduces both information 
asymmetry and morally hazardous agency conflicts between managers and less informed shareholders. Second, 
shareholder litigation leads firms to report more conservatively. Understatement of net assets is less likely to incur 
litigation costs than overstatement of net assets (Watts, 2003). Third, taxation can encourage the use of conservative 
reporting. The use of conservative accounting methods and policies incurs lower taxes. Indeed, by requiring a higher 
degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements, a firm can pay a lower tax in 
its current fiscal year and increase its value (Watts, 2003). Lastly, regulation also provides incentives for 
conservatism. Standard-setting authorities may face political pressure and public criticism. These bodies favour 
conservative accounting practices as this reduces the likelihood of engendering political costs (Watts, 2003). 
 
Existing research suggests that good corporate governance improves accounting quality (Cohen et al., 
2004). Basu (1997), Watts (2003) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007) support the assertion that accounting 
conservatism is one of the most important attributes of higher accounting quality. However, the relation between 
corporate governance and accounting conservatism has not been extensively investigated. For example, Garcia Lara 
et al. (2009) documented that the incorporation of bad news into earnings is significantly timelier in well-governed 
firms. They point out that accounting conservatism provides early notice of bad news to governance bodies by 
easing early investigation in their reasons. Lim (2011) and Ahmed and Henry (2012) document that voluntary 
corporate governance has a positive influence on conditional accounting conservatism. Meanwhile, Chi et al. (2009) 
find that accounting conservatism is used as a substitute for other governance mechanisms in alleviating agency 
problems. The authors argue that firms may rely on accounting conservatism to make up for weaknesses in 
corporate governance. 
 
Recent advances in economic theory show that the board of directors is an important component in 
corporate governance. The board of directors has the power to hire and fire senior management and to monitor their 
activities effectively (see e.g. Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1983; Beasley, 1996; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Adams, 2000). The board of directors serves to mitigate agency problems arising from asymmetric information 
between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Boards of directors require verifiable information 
to monitor manager activity and are therefore expected to insist on higher reporting quality (Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007).Given their important role in accounting behaviour, boards of directors have been the focus of a large body of 
research over the years. However, the link between boards of directors and accounting conservatism has not been 
extensively investigated. Prior studies focused mainly on three board attributes, namely: board size; board 
independence; and board leadership (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Chi et al., 2009; Lim, 2011 
and Ahmed and Henry, 2012). In this work, we include the additional board attributes of gender diversity and board 
activity. 
 
Our study differs from those of Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007), Garcia Lara et al. 
(2007, 2009), Lim (2011), and Ahmed and Henry (2012) in several ways. First, in recent years, a spate of legislative 
reforms have been designed to increase female representation on boards2. Accordingly, our research considers the 
effect of female directorship on accounting conservatism. Second, since the effect of board activity on accounting 
conservatism remains an unanswered question, we include in our study proxies for board meeting frequency and 
board attendance. Third, we extend the existing literature on board attributes and accounting conservatism by 
exploring this relation in the French context, which constitutes a uniquely European environment that differs 
markedly from the English-speaking countries in terms of corporate governance and accounting practices. To test 
our hypotheses, we use the SBF120 French firms over the period 2009-2012. Our main findings can be summarized 
as follows. First, both board activities are positively associated with accounting conservatism. Board meeting 
                                                
1If managers know that losses generated by negative NPV projects will be reflected in financial statements during their tenure in a more timely 
manner, they are less likely to invest in NPV projects because of factors such as reputation, career prospects and earnings-linked compensation. 
2In France, a bill was passed in January 2011 requiring 20% of directors of listed company boards to be women by 2014, rising to 40% by 2017 
(Most recent Spencer Stuart Board indexes). 
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frequency and attendance improve board governance, which in turn are likely to improve the financial reporting 
quality in the French context. Second, a greater board size has a negative effect on conditional accounting 
conservatism. Large boards are associated with less effective monitoring, confused decision-making and reduced 
membership coordination (Eisenberg et al., 1998), which can reduce the quality of accounting scrutiny. In addition, 
we find a positive association between gender diversity and conditional accounting conservatism. This positive 
influence suggests that female directorship improves board monitoring, which in turn is likely to require a higher 
degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. Lastly, board leadership and 
independence do not appear to be significantly related to conditional accounting conservatism. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on board 
attributes and accounting conservatism and develops the research hypotheses. The sample selection and 
methodology used to test the hypotheses are presented in section 3. Section 4 reports the results of the empirical 
tests and provides a robustness check while section 5 concludes our findings. 
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section discusses the existing literature concerning the effect of boards of directors’ attributes on 
accounting conservatism. We consider three board of directors dimensions: board composition; gender diversity; 
and board activities. We will focus on three sub-components of board composition: board size; board independence; 
board leadership; and two sub-components of board activities, which are board meeting frequency and board 
attendance. 
 
2.1. Board Composition And Accounting Conservatism 
 
2.1.1. Board Size And Accounting Conservatism 
 
The existing literature on corporate governance tends to agree that smaller boards can be more efficient 
than larger ones. Boards that become too large, it is claimed, are hampered by coordination and communication 
costs and prone to free-riding among board members (Jensen, 1993). Consistent with this assertion, Yermack 
(1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) find support for a negative association between 
board size and performance. Beasley (1996) documents that the likelihood of financial statement fraud is positively 
related to board size. These results confirm that large boards suffer from lack of monitoring (Ahmed and Duellman, 
2007). In contrast, Klein (2002) and  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that larger boards offer greater monitoring and 
control capabilities than small boards due to their ability to distribute board control tasks over a greater number of 
directors. Consistent with this argument, Xie et al. (2003) find a negative association between board size and 
earnings management. They conclude that larger boards are more effective monitors than small boards, because they 
are able to pool directors’ experience and expertise. The relationship between board size and accounting 
conservatism has been the subject of limited research and is not well understood. Bushman et al. (2004), Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007) and Lim (2011) conclude that board size is unrelated to the asymmetric timeliness of earnings, 
whereas Ahmed and Henry (2012) find that small boards are associated with asymmetric timeliness of good cash 
flow and share return news. Their findings are similar to those of Vafeas (1999) who argues that in a small board, 
directors have more opportunities to discuss accounting in detail. Given these conflicting views, we offer two 
possible relationships between board size and conditional accounting conservatism. The hypotheses are stated as 
follows: 
 
H1.a: There is a negative relation between board size and conditional accounting conservatism 
 
H1.b: There is a positive relation between board size and conditional accounting conservatism 
 
2.1.2 Board Independence And Accounting Conservatism 
 
Being independent of management influence, outside directors are essential to the management of a firm 
(Weisbach, 1988). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are expected to offer shareholders the 
greatest protection against managerial opportunism. Previous studies show that outside and inside directors may 
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have different incentives regarding accounting practices, in particular regarding accounting conservatism. Board of 
directors may use conservative accounting to reduce agency costs (Watts, 2003; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). 
Outside directors will improve corporate governance control and the effectiveness of the board of directors (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Therefore, we expect them to encourage more conservative attitude in financial reporting 
(Beekes et al., 2004; Bushman et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007). By contrast, inside directors may harm 
shareholders by making the board less effective. In such situation, management may compromise the quality of 
financial reporting by requiring less conservative practices. The empirical evidences of Beekes et al. (2004) support 
this contention in UK boards and show that firms with a relatively high proportion of outsiders tend to be more 
conservative. Thus, a board with a relatively high proportion of outsiders is more likely to effectively monitor the 
management team and force them to recognize bad news in a timelier fashion than good news in financial reporting. 
Previous studies on board composition such as that of Ahmed and Duellman (2007) argue that boards dominated by 
insiders have a lower asymmetric timeliness coefficient than boards with lower levels of insiders. Hence, they 
suggest that boards dominated by insiders are likely to provide managers with more incentives to choose aggressive 
(less conservative) accounting methods. Meanwhile, Bushman et al., (2004) and Ahmed and Henry (2012) find no 
relation between board independence and earnings timeliness. Other studies show that the presence of outside 
directors reduces the occurrences of financial statement fraud (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al. 1996) and earnings 
management (Klein, 2002; Davidson et al., 2005). Beekes et al. (2004), among others, maintain that as the number 
of independent directors increases on a board, the firm’s monitoring capability increases and it is therefore expected 
to insist on greater accounting conservatism. The preceding discussion leads to our next hypothesis: 
 
H2. There is a positive association between board independence and conditional accounting conservatism 
 
2.1.3 Board Leadership And Accounting Conservatism  
 
The chairperson oversees the work of the board and its meetings, and the process of hiring, firing, 
evaluating, and compensating the CEO (Jensen, 1993). The separation of CEO and chairperson positions is 
important for the effective functioning of the board. As a result, CEO duality may reduce the monitoring abilities of 
the board and provide greater opportunities for managerial entrenchment (Dechow et al. 1995; Klein, 2002; Rahman 
and Haniffa, 2005). Few studies examine the association between CEO duality and accounting conservatism. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidences to date are inconclusive. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) find that CEO duality is 
unrelated to the asymmetric timeliness when earnings and returns are cumulated. Krishnan and Vivanathan (2008) 
and Lim (2011) find that the separation of the CEO’s and chairperson’s roles, as an indicator of good governance, is 
positively associated with accounting conservatism. With regard to the existing research, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
H3. There is a negative relation between board leadership and conditional accounting conservatism 
 
2.2 Gender Diversity And Accounting Conservatism 
 
The existing literature reveals that female representation on boards of directors is an important factor 
required by investors (Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Adams and Ferria, 2009). The need to build board 
diversity stems from the following motivations. First, female directors are significantly more risk-averse and less 
prone to overconfidence than male directors in decision-making (see e.g. Riley and Chow, 1992; Ambrose and 
Schminke, 1999 and Krishnan and Parsons, 2008). Second, female directors exhibit independent thinking (see e.g. 
Carter et al., 2003 and Hillman et al., 2007), which implies that they make decisions in different ways to male 
directors. Third, Jelinek and Adler (1988) and Cohen et al. (1998) document that female directors develop and 
practice a ‘trust-building’ leadership style more than a ‘command’ style favoured by their male counterparts. ‘Trust-
building’ presupposes more information disclosure and lower information asymmetry (Srinidhi et al., 2011). Lastly, 
female directors are less tolerant than male directors towards opportunistic behaviour (Srinidhi et al., 2011). 
Therefore, gender diversity is likely to increase board’s effectiveness and monitoring capacity (Adams and Ferreia, 
2009). Recent empirical studies explore whether female directorship affects a firm’s outcomes. Carter et al. (2003) 
and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find a positive relation between female directorship and firm performance. 
Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that firms with female board members exhibit a higher earnings quality. They point out the 
tangible consequence of the monitoring exerted by female directors. By contrast, Shrader et al. (1997) report no 
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significant association between gender diversity on boards and firm performance. Based on several empirical 
findings, we propose that firms with female directorship will improve board monitoring, which in turn is likely to 
require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. Therefore, 
the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4. There is a positive association between gender diversity and conditional accounting conservatism 
 
2.3 Board Activities And Accounting Conservatism 
 
 Current research on board effectiveness identifies the level of board meeting activity as a primary measure 
of directorial influence (see e.g. Vafeas, 1999). Conger et al. (1998) note that the board meeting is an important 
opportunity to discuss and exchange ideas and monitor the management team. Prior studies find that more active 
boards lead to favourable outcomes. Jensen (1993), Conger et al. (1998) and Garcia Lara el al. (2007) document that 
the frequency of board meetings is an important attribute contributing to good corporate governance. Zhang et al. 
(2007) find a positive relation between board meeting frequency and internal control weaknesses. Vafeas (1999) 
documents that boards with high meeting frequency improve financial performance. Xie et al. (2003) document a 
negative association between board meeting frequency and earnings management, indicating that when boards meet 
more often they are able to limit discretionary accruals. Adams and Ferreira (2009), among others, argue that board 
attendance is an indication of directors’ diligence because it is the primary channel through which they have access 
to specific information about managerial activities. If directors attend board meetings regularly, the accounts 
reporting process benefits from greater oversight. Thus, based on the previous findings, we can summarize that 
board meeting frequency and attendance allow directors to assign more time to discuss the financial reporting 
process. Overall, empirical evidences show that these two board activities induce managers to produce more 
conservative accounting practices by presenting bad news in a more timely manner than good news. Accordingly, 
we test these two hypotheses: 
 
H5.a: There is a positive relation between board meeting frequency and conditional accounting conservatism 
 
H5.b: There is a positive relation between board attendance and conditional accounting conservatism. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
To examine the relation between board attributes and conditional accounting conservatism, we use the 
SBF120 French firms over the period 2009-2012 period. To estimate conditional accounting conservatism, we use 
the Basu model: 
 !!,!!!,!!! = 𝛽! +   𝛽!𝑅!,! +   𝛽!𝐷!,! +   𝛽!𝐷!,! ∗ 𝑅!,! +   𝜀!,!         (Eq.1) 
 
Where: 
 
β0is the intercept;  
Ei, t/Pi, t–1represents annual earnings before extraordinary items per share divided by the share price at the 
beginning of the period for the firm i;  
Ri, t is the buy–and-hold return for the firm i, beginning the 4th month of fiscal year t and ending 4 months 
after the end of the fiscal year;  
Di, t is an indicator dummy variable for the firm i, equal to 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero return) 
and 0 in the case of good news (positive return); and 
ɛ is an error term. 
 
Historical stock prices were obtained from the Datastream database and financial data are drawn from the 
Worldscope database. We hand-collected all board attributes from the companies’ annual reports.  
 
In the above regression, β1 measures the response of earnings to returns when returns are positive and 
(β1+β3) measures the response when returns are negative (Basu, 1997). Conservatism implies (β1+β3)>β1, that is when 
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β3> 0. The coefficient on the interaction term β3 is the measure of conservatism and is referred to as the asymmetric 
timeliness coefficient (Basu, 1997). β3 is expected to be significantly positive, implying that more conservative firms 
have greater asymmetric verifiability between gains and losses (Basu, 1997; Beekes et al., 2004; Garcia Lara et al., 
2007).3However, despite the widespread use of this model in literature on accounting, Roychowdhury and Watts 
(2007) highlight that this model can introduce substantial measurement error because it incorporates only a single 
year of data (in returns and earnings). The authors therefore suggest incorporating returns and earnings cumulatively 
over longer periods. In this paper, we adopted the corrective approach suggested by Roychowdhry and Watts (2007) 
and cumulated earnings and returns over several years when estimating conditional accounting conservatism. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the criteria used to screen our sample. We eliminate the financial and banking firms 
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) from our sample, given that they have different accounting, financial and 
operating. In addition, 34 firm-year observations were excluded due to missing data. As Table 1 indicates, the above 
process leaves 374 firm-year observations from the original sample. Table 1 (panel B) describes the industry 
membership of our sample assigned on the basis of 4-digit SIC: 
 
Table 1. Sample Collecting Procedures And Distribution Of Companies In Sample By Industry 
Panel A: Sample collection procedure 
 Firm-year observations 
Initial sample 480 
(-) Financial and insurance firms 72 
(-) Missing data/Not continuously listed 34 
Total 374 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution of industry	  
Industry Sic Codes 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Petroleum  13, 29  3 3 3 3 
Consumer durable  25, 30, 36, 37, 50, 55, 57  18 19 19 19 
Basic Industry  10, 12, 14, 24, 26, 28, 33  10 10 11 12 
Food&Tobacco  1, 2, 9, 20, 21, 54  8 7 7 7 
Construction  15, 16, 17, 32, 52  4 4 4 4 
Capital Goods  34, 35, 38  8 8 8 8 
Transportation  40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47  2 2 2 2 
Utilities 46,48,49 6 7 7 7 
Textile and Trade  22, 23, 31, 51, 53, 56, 59  1 1 1 3 
Services  72, 73, 75, 76, 80, 82, 87, 89  21 21 22 22 
Leisure  27, 58, 70, 78, 79  5 5 5 5 
Other  5 5 5 5 
 
3.1 Proxies For Explanatory Variables And Control Variables 
 
Our study tries to explain the relation between boards of directors' attributes and conditional accounting 
conservatism. In this section, we provide the definitions for the explanatory variables (see Table 2). Furthermore, to 
reduce the potential effect of the omitted variables, we also include in our model three control variables: (1) firm 
size; (2) litigation; and (3) Xlist. 
 
Firm size is represented by the natural logarithm of total sales. The firm size was log-transformed to correct 
skewness. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) assert that larger firms are likely to attract greater public scrutiny than 
smaller firms, and face greater political costs in the event of irresponsible accounting. Therefore, we expect  that 
larger companies would be more cautious in recognizing gains and faster in recognizing losses in order to avoid 
litigation. 
 
Litigation is represented by an indicator variable coded 1 if the company is classified as a high-ligation risk 
industry, and 0 otherwise. High-litigation industries are firms with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 
                                                
3The notion behind Basu’s measure of conservatism is that bad news is incorporated into earnings faster than good news (asymmetric 
verifiability). 
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5200-5961, and 7370. The cost of litigation is higher in companies that overstate earnings and net assets than 
companies that understate net assets and earnings (Watts, 2003). The market will punish overstatement more than 
understatement of net assets and earnings by the reducing market value of the company. This decrease in market 
value may reduce shareholder wealth. To avoid financial shareholder harm, good management provides incentives 
to record bad news earlier than good news in financial reporting (Qiang, 2007).  
 
XLIST (crosslisting) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S. that requires 
reconciliation to U.S GAAP and 0 otherwise. Recent cross-listing literature suggests that firms that cross-list in one 
or more foreign exchanges in addition to their domestic exchanges have incentives to produce more informative 
accounting reports (Lang et al., 2006). 
 
Table 2. Independent Variables Definition 
Variables Name Measure 
Explanatory Variables 
Board Size BS The natural logarithm of the total number of directors serving on the board. 
Board Independence BI The number of independent directors divided by board size (proportion of independent directors). 
Board Leadership DUAL A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the same person serves as both CEO and chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
Board Meeting MEET The natural logarithm of board meeting held per year. 
Board Attendance ASSID The percentage of board assiduity. 
Gender Diversity GEND The percentage of female directors on the board. 
Control Variables 
Firm Size SIZE The natural logarithm of total sales. The firm size was log-transformed to correct skewness. 
Litigation LIT 
A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the company is classified as a high-ligation 
risk industry, and 0 otherwise. High-litigation industries are firms with SIC 
codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674,5200-5961, and 7370. 
Xlist LIST A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S. that requires reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2 Model Specification  
 
To investigate the association between accounting conservatism and board attributes, the standard Basu’s 
model was modified by introducing the variable of board attributes. Each independent and control variable included 
in the model interacts with R, D, and R*D.  
   !!    ,!  ,!!!!  !,!  !!!! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑅!,      !,!!! + 𝛽!𝐷!,      !,!!! + 𝛽!𝑅!,      !,!!! ∗   𝐷!,      !  ,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,      ! +   𝛽  !𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,      !   ∗  𝑅!,      !,!!! + 𝛽!  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,      ! ∗   𝐷!,      !,!!! + 𝛽!  𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,      !   ∗ 𝑅!,      !,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,      !,!!! +𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟  𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠!,      !  &  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,      !   + 𝑌𝑟 + 𝜖!  (Eq. 2) 
 
Where: 
 
βo is the intercept;  
E i ,t,t–j is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operation per share for the firm i cumulative 
from year t-j to year t, with j varying from 0 to 3;  
Pi ,t,t–j -1is the share price at the end of the year t for the firm i;  
Ri ,t,t–j is the buy-and-hold return for the firm starting 4 months after the end of the fiscal year t-j-1 and 
ending 4 months after the end of the year t;  
Di ,t,t–j is an indicator variable set to 1 if Ri ,t,t–j is negative and 0 otherwise; and 𝜖!is an error term in year t. 
 
We included three dummy variables in our regressions (Yr) that control for fixed year effects. The coefficient of the 
interaction term 𝑅!,      !,!!! ∗   𝐷!,      !,!!! with the explanatory and control variables represents the effect of the respective 
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variable on asymmetric timeliness. For example, the effect of board attribute on asymmetric timeliness is observed 
on β7, which is the coefficient of the interaction term 𝑅!,      !,!!! ∗   𝐷!,      !,!!! with board attribute. The interaction terms 
between independent variables and the components of accounting conservatism measure (𝑅!,      !,!!!, 𝐷!,      !,!!! 
and  𝑅!,      !,!!! ∗   𝐷!,      !,!!!) in the Basu (1997) model raises the concern of potential multi-collinearity problems. To 
mitigate this problem, we mean-center all the continuous variables and then interact them  (Cronbach, 1987 and 
Aiken and West, 1991). The Granger causality test was employed to discern whether the direction of causality flows 
from earnings to returns or vice versa. We find evidence of significant unidirectional relation from earnings to 
returns. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
This section provides the empirical results. First, we briefly discuss some descriptive statistics. Second, we 
present the regression results showing to what extent boards of directors’ attributes can affect conditional accounting 
conservatism. Lastly, we provide a robustness check. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics And Correlations 
 
Table 3 (Panel A, B) exposes descriptive statistics for the variables used in our model to investigate the 
relation between conditional accounting conservatism and board attributes. In this table, we report only descriptive 
statistics for returns and earnings for the four-year cumulative sample. We underline that the mean value of earnings 
before extraordinary items per share divided by the stock price is of (0.185%), the minimum value is of (−1.066%), 
and the maximum one is of (2.085%). Return varies from (-0.886%) to (4.317%), and the mean value is (0.103%). 
The mean value of board assiduity is (89.2%). On average, the boards of directors of the companies of our sample 
consist of 12 members, with 50% of outside directors. The mean percentage of female representation on boards is 
15.3%. Panel B in Table 3 shows that in 53.7% of the firm’s sample, the CEO is also the chair of the board. 
 
Table 3 (panel C) presents the Pearson correlation coefficient between the dependent variable (E/P), board 
attributes (MEET, ASSID, DUAL, BS, BI, GEND) and control variables (SIZE, LIT, LIST). Four board attributes 
are correlated with (E/P) which are MEET, BI, BS and DUAL. Most of the board attributes are significantly 
correlated with each other. The variance inflation factor (VIF) test indicates the absence of multicollinearity among 
the independent variables. Therefore, these variables can be included together in a regression model without 
estimation bias. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics For Variables (Before Winsorizing) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A. Continuous variables 
E/P 374 0.185 0.267 -1.066 2.085 
R 374 0.103 0.719 -0.886 4.317 
BS (before logarithmic 
transformation) 374 12.056 3.589 3 23 
BI 374 0.501 0.203 0 1 
MEET (before logarithmic 
transformation) 374 8.203 2.672 3 22 
ASSID 374 0.892 0.080 0.66 1 
GEND 374 0.153 0.105 0 0.5 
SIZE (sales) (before logarithmic 
transformation) 374 18159.17 27887.79 10.04 160909,9 
	  
Panel B. Dichotomous variables 
Variables Value 1 Value 0 Frequency Proportion Frequency Proportion 
D 204 0.545 170 0.454 
DUAL 201 0.537 173 0.462 
LIT 84 0.224 290 0.775 
LIST 218 0.582 156 0.417 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2015 Volume 31, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 879 The Clute Institute 
(Table 3 continued) 
Panel C. The Pearson correlation 
 
E/P MEET BI BS GEND ASSID DUAL SIZE LIST LIT VIF 
E/P 1           MEET -0.10** 1         5.27 BI -0.10** -0.05 1        1.41 BS 0.16** 0.01 -0.00 1       2.01 GEND 0.07 0.03 0.10** 0.10** 1      2.36 ASSID 0.035 -0.21*** 0.27*** 0.11** 0.01 1     3.79 DUAL -0.08* 0.05 -0.19*** 0.04 0.01 -0.13*** 1    1.19 SIZE 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.11** 0.58*** 0.15*** 0.00 -0.05 1   5.75 LIST -0.0 0.05 0.29*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.20*** -0.00 0.30*** 1  3.51 LIT -0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.26*** -0.08 -0.12** -0.03 -0.21*** -0.14*** 1 1.31 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The above table shows Pearson correlations for the sample. E/P = is earnings before extraordinary items 
and discontinued operation per share deflated by the share price for the firm i cumulative from year t-j to year t, with 
j varying from 0 to 3; BS =the natural logarithm of the total number of directors serving on the board; BI = the 
porportion of independent directors on board (the number of independent directors divided by board size); DUAL = 
an indicator variable coded 1 if the same person serves as both CEO and chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise. 
MEET = the natural logarithm of board meeting held per year; ASSID= the percentage of board assiduity; GEND = 
the percentage of female directors on the board; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total sales; LIT = an indicator 
variable coded 1 if the company is classified as a high-ligation risk industry, and 0 otherwise. High-litigation 
industries are firms with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674,5200-5961, and 7370; LIST= a dummy 
variable, equal to 1 if the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S. that requires reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, and 0 
otherwise.  
 
4.2 The Relation Between Board Attributes And Conditional Accounting Conservatism 
 
Table 4 reports the results of pooled regressions with backward cumulation (4 years). Model (1) presents 
the multivariate regression results based on asymmetric timeliness to measure conditional accounting conservatism. 
In models 2, 3 and 4, we allow the asymmetric timeliness coefficient to vary with board attributes and control 
variables. Because we generally find heteroscedasticity problems, we report corrected t-values for each coefficient 
(White, 1980). The significant coefficient on the conservatism variable (Di, t,t-j * Ri, t,t-j) in model (1) indicates that 
French companies use conservative financial reporting.  
 
4.2.1 Conditional Accounting Conservatism And Board Composition 
 
The coefficient on board size(𝐵𝑆!,! ∗ 𝑅!,      !  ,!!! ∗   𝐷!,      !,!!!) is significantly negative. This result provides 
empirical support for our first hypothesis (H1.a), which proposes that there is a negative relation between board size 
and conditional accounting conservatism. Our finding is consistent with previous studies such as Ahmed and Henry 
(2012), and contrary to the finding of Bushman et al. (2004) and Ahmed and Duellman (2007), who find no relation 
between board size and accounting conservatism. Several works on corporate governance show that when boards 
become too large, they are less effective monitors because they are hampered by coordination and communication 
difficulties as well as free-riding among board members (Jensen, 1993). Our finding supports the view that large 
boards are associated with less effective monitoring and decision-making (Eisenberg et al. 1998), which in turn 
gives managers greater discretion in the use of aggressive accounting practices. 
 
 Model (2) examines the relation between board independence and conditional accounting conservatism. The 
regression coefficient on board independence (𝐵𝐼!,! ∗ 𝑅!,      !  ,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,      !,!!!) is positive but insignificant. This result is 
not supportive of our second hypothesis, which posits that there is a positive relation between conditional accounting 
conservatism and board independence. Thus, independent directors may not be more inclined to monitor accounting 
quality. Empirical evidence by Bushman et al. (2004) and Ahmed and Henry (2012) support our finding, whereas 
Beekes et al. (2004) and Lim (2011) identified a significant relation between board independence and earnings 
timeliness. 
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Table 4 presents the results of our third hypothesis, which proposes a negative relation between board 
leadership and conditional accounting conservatism. Examining the result for (𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿!,! ∗ 𝑅!,      !  ,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,      !,!!!), this 
variable is not significant in our model. Our finding is similar to Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and contrary to 
previous studies conducted by Krishnan and Vivanathan (2008) and Lim (2011), who found a significant relation 
between board leadership and accounting conservatism. 
 
4.2.2. Conditional Accounting Conservatism And Gender Diversity 
 
Female participation on boards is predicted to be positively associated with the earnings timeliness 
coefficient. The coefficient on gender diversity 𝐺𝐸𝑁𝐷!,! ∗ 𝑅!,      !  ,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,      !,!!!  shows a significantly positive 
relation with the recognition of bad news relative to good news, measured by the reverse regression of returns and 
earnings. This result confirms our hypothesis H4. Our findings support prior research that finds that gender diversity 
affects firm performance. For instance, Srinidhi et al. (2011) find that boards with female participation exhibit 
higher earnings quality. In addition, Carter el al. (2003) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) document a 
positive association between female directors and firm performance. Accounting conservatism is an important 
aspect of good monitoring demanded by investors and a higher level of accounting conservatism therefore 
constitutes an important objective for the board. In our study, the board of directors can use female participation to 
achieve this objective. In this situation, managers have less incentive to choose aggressive accounting behaviour by 
preferring a higher level of accounting conservatism. This finding suggests that gender diversity in the boardroom 
delivers more prudent reporting practices and we therefore call for more female directors to be appointed on boards. 
 
4.2.3 Conditional Accounting Conservatism And Board Activities 
 
The coefficient on board meeting (𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇!,! ∗ 𝑅!,      !  ,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,      !,!!!) shows a positive and significant 
association with conditional accounting conservatism. This result confirms our hypothesis H5.a, which presents a 
positive association between board meetings and conditional accounting conservatism. In conjunction with other 
studies such as Vafeas (1999), our result suggests that more active boards, as measured by the number of board 
meetings, require managers to practice better accounting choices. Adopting a higher degree of verification to 
recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses increases the level of reporting quality. The 
effect of board attendance on conditional accounting conservatism also appears to be significantly positive. The 
coefficient of the multivariate regression  (𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷!,! ∗ 𝑅!,      !  ,!!! ∗ 𝐷!,      !,!!!) is positive and statistically significant. We 
argue that in the French context, board attendance improves board governance (see also Adams and Ferreira, 2009), 
which in turn is likely to improve the financial reporting quality and hence encourages managers to adopt a higher 
level of accounting conservatism. Overall, these results show that increased board activity appears to guarantee the 
quality of reporting. 
 
Turning to control variables, the coefficient on firm size indicates a positive but insignificant relation with 
all board attributes. The coefficient on litigation is only positive and significant in models (3) and (4). Besides, we 
fail to find clear evidence that cross-listing firms exhibit greater conditional accounting conservatism, as measured 
by the reverse regression of returns and earnings. 
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Table 4. Regression Results Of Effects Of Boards Of Directors’ Attributes On Accounting Conservatism (Four-Year Cumulative Data) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 Expected Signs 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Intercept ? 0.232*** (5.62) 
0.301*** 
(4.90) 
0.32*** 
(4.39) 
0.313*** 
(5.48) 
R  
0.147*** 
(4.45) 
0.174*** 
(3.37) 
0.183*** 
(5.51) 
0.189*** 
(4.87) 
D  
-0.026 
(-0.70) 
-0.041 
(-0.78) 
-0.099* 
(-1,69) 
-0.089 
(-1.59) 
R*D  
0.256*** 
(2.85) 
0.407*** 
(2.71) 
0.359** 
(2.44) 
0.343** 
(2.34) 
BS   
0.062 
(0.70)   
BS*R   
0.006 
(0.07)   
BS*D   
-0.246 
(-1.54)   
BS*R*D +/-  
-0.674* 
(-1.76)   
BI   
-0.318** 
(-2.28)   
BI*R   
0.556*** 
(4.04)   
BI*D   
0.452** 
(2.14)   
BI*R*D +  
0.001 
(0.00)   
DUAL   
-0.041 
(-1.47)   
DUAL*R   
0.009 
(0.14)   
DUAL*D   
-0.069 
(-0.73)   
DUAL*R*D -  
-0.169 
(-1.01)   
MEET    
0.031 
(0.56)  
MEET*R    
-0.149* 
(-1.75)  
MEET*D    
0.048 
(0.48)  
MEET*R*D +   
0.439** 
(2.19)  
ASSID    
0.135 
(0.55)  
ASSID*R    
-0.364 
(-1.22)  
ASSID*D    
0.645 
(0.93)  
ASSID*R*D +   
1.697** 
(2.02)  
GEND     
-0.048 
(-0.20) 
GEND*R     
-0.084 
(-0.31) 
GEND*D     
0.780** 
(1.97) 
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(Table 4 continued) 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 
 Expected Signs 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
GEND*R*D +    
1.451** 
(2.47) 
SIZE   
0.030** 
(2.18) 
0.036*** 
(2.75) 
0.029** 
(2.48) 
SIZE*R   
0.014 
(0.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
-0.000 
(-0.03) 
SIZE*D   
-0.015 
(-0.51) 
-0.034 
(-1.10) 
-0.045 
(-1.46) 
SIZE*R*D +  
0.043 
(1.34) 
0.015 
(0.67) 
0.011 
(0.56) 
LIT   
0.012 
(0.42) 
-0.023 
(-0.82) 
-0.030 
(-1.07) 
LIT*R   
0.073 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.015 
(0.26) 
LIT*D   
0.064 
(0.71) 
0.11 
(1.10) 
0.099 
(1.00) 
LIT*R*D +  
0.061 
(0.28) 
0.402* 
(1.89) 
0.391* 
(1.84) 
LIST   
-0.076 
(-1.57) 
-0.124** 
(-2.06) 
-0.110** 
(-2.13) 
LIST*R   
0.06 
(0.88) 
0.147* 
(1.90) 
0.149** 
(2.09) 
LIST*D   
0.069 
(-0.015) 
0.082 
(0.64) 
0.098 
(0.87) 
LIST*R*D +  
-0.178 
(-1.14) 
-0.361* 
(-1.88) 
-0.331* 
(-1.91) 
N  374 374 374 374 
Adjusted R2  0.172 0.271 0.229 0.243 * Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The above table reports the results of the following two equations: 
 
(Eq. 1):  !!    ,!  ,!!!!  !,!  !!!! =β0+ β1Ri, t, t-j + β2Di,t,t-j+ β3Ri,t,t-j*Di,t,t-j+Yr+  𝜖! 
 
(Eq.2):    !!    ,!  ,!!!!  !,!  !!!! = β0+ β1Ri, t, t-j + β2Di,t,t-j+ β3Ri,t,t-j*Di,t,t-j+ β4Board attributei,t+ β5Board attributei,t* Ri, t, t-j+ β6Board 
attributei,t* Di,t,t-j+ β7Board attributei,t* Ri, t, t-j* Di,t,t-j+Other board attributesi,t & Control variablesi,t+Yr+𝜖! 
 
E i ,t,t–j is earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operation per share for the firm i cumulative from 
year t-j  to year t, with j varying from 0 to 3; Pi,t-j-1= the share price for the firm i at the end of the year t; Ri ,t,t–j = the 
buy-and-hold return for the firm i starting 4 months after the end of the fiscal year t-j-1 and ending 4 months after 
the end of the year t; D i ,t,t–j = an indicator variable set at1 if Ri ,t,t–j is negative and 0 otherwise; Yr = three dummy 
variables that control for the year of the test period. The first dummy variable takes the value of 1 for the year 2010 
and 0 otherwise, the second takes the value of 1 for the year 2011 and 0 otherwise, and the last one takes the value 
of 1 for the year 2012 and 0 otherwise ;BS i,t= the natural logarithm of the total number of directors serving on the 
board; BI i,t= the porportion of independent directors on board (the number of independent directors divided by 
board size); DUALi,t = an indicator variable coded 1 if the same person serves as both CEO and chairperson of the 
board, and 0 otherwise; MEETi,t = the natural logarithm of board meeting held per year; ASSIDi,t = the percentage of 
board assiduity; GEND i,t= the percentage of female directors on the board; SIZE i,t= the natural logarithm of total 
sales; LITi,t = an indicator variable coded 1 if the company is classified as a high-ligation risk industry, and 0 
otherwise. High-litigation industries are firms with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674,5200-5961, and 
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7370; LISTi,t = a dummy variable, equal to 1 if  the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S. that requires reconciliation 
to U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise.  
 
4.3. Robustness Check 
 
To ensure the robustness of our empirical results, we use two alternative measures of accounting 
conservatism: the time-series model developed by Basu (1997) and the accrual-based measure by Givoly and Hayn 
(2000). The time-series model focuses on the extent to which earnings changes reverse. Reversal of earnings 
changes is an indication of the transitory component in earnings. Therefore, we expect negative earning’s changes to 
reverse more than positive earnings changes in cases of conditional accounting conservatism (Lim, 2011). For this 
purpose, the following equation is estimated: 
 𝛥𝐸!,!/𝑃!,!!! =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! +   𝜇!,!  (Eq. 3) 
 
Where: 
 𝛽!is the intercept;  𝛥𝐸!,!/𝑃!,!!!  is the change in earnings per share for firm i in year t deflated by the share price;  𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!!  is the change in earnings per share for firm i in year t-1 deflated by the share price; 𝐷!,!!!= 1if𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!!is negative and 0 otherwise; and  
 µ is an error term.  
 
The coefficient 𝛽! is expected to be negative if bad news is recognized timelier than good news. 
To investigate the association between board attributes and conditional accounting conservatism, we include in the 
above regression all explanatory and control variables. For that, we use the following regression: 
 𝛥𝐸!,!/𝑃!,!!! =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,!     +𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,!   ∗ 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! ∗𝐷!,!!! + Other  𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠!,!  &  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + Yr + 𝜇!,! (Eq. 4) 
 
All explanatory variables were interacted with 𝛥𝐸/𝑃, D and D*𝛥𝐸/𝑃. We included three dummy variables 
in our regressions (Yr) that control for fixed year effects. The coefficient 𝛽! is expected to be negative if board 
attribute variables increase conditional accounting conservatism in capturing economic income. Our second proxy of 
accounting conservatism is the accrual-based measure developed by Givoly and Hayn (2000), who argue that 
conservative accounting results in persistently negative accruals. To perform this measure, the following model was 
used: 
 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆!,! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!! 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,!,! + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + 𝑌𝑟 +∈!,! (Eq. 5) 
 
CONSi,t represents the income before extraordinary items less cash flows from operations plus depreciation expense 
deflated by total assets. To reduce the effect of temporary large accruals, which tend to reverse within a one or two 
years, our measure of accounting conservatism (CONS) is averaged over a three-year period centered on the year of 
interest, multiplied by negative one (Richardson et al., 2005). Positive value of CONS indicates greater accounting 
conservatism. 
 
 Tables 5 and 6 expose the results of the estimation of equations (3), (4) and (5) that asses the association 
between board attributes and accounting conservatism by using time-series and accrual measures. All our results 
confirm our above finding with Basu’s measure. We find that both board activities and gender diversity increase 
accounting conservatism. As shown in tables 5 and 6, we find that larger board size decreases accounting 
conservatism. Tables 5 and 6 also show that board independence and board leadership are not significantly 
associated with conditional accounting conservatism. 
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Table 5. Regression Results Of Effects Of Boards Of Directors’ Attributes On Accounting Conservatism (Time-Series Model) 
   Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 Expected signs 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Intercept ? -0.003 (-0.47) 
-0.071** 
(-2.44) 
-0.070*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.067** 
(-2.46) 
ΔE/P  
-0.297** 
(-2.37) 
-0.437* 
(-1.82) 
-0.265* 
(-1.91) 
-0.413** 
(-2.54) 
D  
-0.007 
(-0.43) 
0.015 
(0.39) 
-0.028 
(0.72) 
0.020 
(0.64) 
D*ΔE/P - -0.438* (-1.66) 
-0.561 
(-1.32) 
-0.361 
(-1.15) 
-0.619* 
(-1.68) 
BS   
0.008 
(0.44)   
BS*ΔE/P   
-1.285 
(-1.25)   
BS* D   
0.087* 
(1.86)   
BS* D*ΔE/P +/-  
3.288** 
(2.29)   
BI   
-0.002 
(-0.06)   
BI* ΔE/P   
-0.461 
(0.54)   
BI* D   
0.035 
(0.38)   
BI* D*ΔE/P -  
-0.560 
(-0.34)   
DUAL   
0.003 
(0.30)   
DUAL*ΔE/P   
0.343 
(1.29)   
DUAL*D   
-0.013 
(-0.44)   
DUAL*D*ΔE/P +  
-0.53 
(-1.27)   
MEET    
0.005 
(0.33)  
MEET* ΔE/P    
-0.268 
(-0.94)  
MEET* D    
-0.104* 
(-1.70)  
MEET*D*ΔE/P -   
-1.113* 
(-1.68)  
ASSID    
-0.022 
(-0.20)  
ASSID*ΔE/P    
4.102** 
(1.99)  
ASSID*D    
0.081 
(0.29)  
ASSID*D*ΔE/P -   
-1.537** 
(-2.47)  
GEND     
0.049 
(0.82) 
GEND*ΔE/P     
-1.201 
(-1.14) 
GEND*D     
-0.175 
(-1.50) 
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(Table 5 continued) 
   Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
 Expected signs 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
GEND*D*ΔE/P -    
-1.501* 
(-1.74) 
SIZE   
-0.013** 
(-2.21) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.014*** 
(-2.82) 
SIZE*ΔE/P   
0.249* 
(1.70) 
0.128* 
(1.75) 
0.117* 
(1.65) 
SIZE* D   
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.021* 
(1.91) 
0.016 
(1.31) 
SIZE* D*ΔE/P -  
-0.472** 
(-2.07) 
0.052 
(0.27) 
-0.068 
(-034) 
LIT   
0.025 
(1.62) 
0.040** 
(2.49) 
0.024 
(1.57) 
LIT*ΔE/P   
-0.232 
(-0.50) 
-0.311 
(-1.53) 
0.038 
(0.19) 
LIT* D   
0.047* 
(1.82) 
0.047* 
(1.73) 
0.052* 
(1.93) 
LIT* D*ΔE/P -  
0.843 
(1.22) 
1.219* 
(1.86) 
0.698 
(1.21) 
LIST   
0.036* 
(1.84) 
0.036* 
(1.95) 
0.032* 
(1.85) 
LIST* ΔE/P   
-0.330 
(-0.88) 
-0.210 
(-0.74) 
-0.176 
(-0.70) 
LIST*D   
-0.043 
(-1.05) 
-0.071 
(-1.52) 
-0.051 
(-1.31) 
LIST*D*ΔE/P -  
0.904* 
(1.76) 
0.141 
(0.26) 
0.583 
(1.23) 
N  374 374 374 374 
Adjusted R2  0.088 0.222 0.226 0.185 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
The above table reports the results of the following two equations: 
 
(Eq. 3):   𝛥𝐸!,!/𝑃!,!!! =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! +   𝜇!,! 
 
(Eq. 4): 𝛥𝐸!,!/𝑃!,!!! =   𝛽! +   𝛽!𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! +   𝛽!𝐷!,!!! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,!     +𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,!   ∗ 𝐷!,!!! + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,! ∗ 𝛥𝐸!,!!!/𝑃!,!!! ∗𝐷!,!!! + Other  𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠!,!  &  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + Yr + 𝜇!,! 
 ΔE!,!/P!,!!! = is the change in earnings per share for firm i in year t deflated by the share price; ΔE!,!!!/P!,!!! is the 
change in earnings per share for firm i in year t-1 deflated by the share price; D!,!!!= 1 if  ΔE!,!!!/P!,!!!is negative 
and 0 otherwise and µ is an error term. Yr = three dummy variables that control for the year of the test period. The 
first dummy variable takes the value of 1 for the year 2010 and 0 otherwise, the second takes the value of 1 for the 
year 2011 and 0 otherwise, and the last one takes the value of 1 for the year 2012 and 0 otherwise;BS i,t= the natural 
logarithm of the total number of directors serving on the board; BI i,t=  the porportion of independent directors on 
board (the number of independent directors divided by board size); DUALi,t = an indicator variable coded 1 if the 
same person serves as both CEO and chairperson of the board, and 0 otherwise; MEETi,t = the natural logarithm of 
board meeting held per year; ASSIDi,t = the percentage of board assiduity; GEND i,t= the percentage of female 
directors on the board; SIZE i,t= the natural logarithm of total sales; LITi,t = an indicator variable coded 1 if the 
company is classified as a high-ligation risk industry, and 0 otherwise. High-litigation industries are firms with SIC 
codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674,5200-5961, and 7370; LISTi,t = a dummy variable, equal to 1 if  the 
firm has an ADR traded in the U.S. that requires reconciliation to U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 6. Regression Results Of Effects Of Board Of Directors Attributes On Accounting Conservatism (Accruals Model) 
  Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
 Expected signs Coeff (t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Coeff 
(t-stat) 
Intercept ? -1.068* (-1.89) 
-3.253** 
(-2.15) 
-1.422** 
(-2.04) 
BS +/- -0.156* (-1.77)   
BI + -0.194 (-1.43)   
DUAL - -0.021 (-0.42)   
MEET +  0.439** (2.09)  
ASSID +  1.389* (1.82)  
GEND +   0.697* (1.68) 
SIZE + 0.172** (2.05) 
0.126** 
(2.22) 
0.15** 
(2.05) 
LIT + 0.195** (2.02) 
0.179** 
(2.17) 
0.217** 
(2.04) 
LIST + 0.26 (0.84) 
-0.035 
(-0.83) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
N  374 374 374 
Adjusted R2  0.155 0.224 0.164 
* Significant at the 10% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
The above table reports the results of the following equation: 
 
(Eq.5):  𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆!,! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!! 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒!,!,! + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + 𝑌𝑟 +∈!,! 
 
CONSi,t  is income before extraordinary items less cash flows from operations plus depreciation expense deflated by 
total assets. To reduce the effect of temporary large accruals, which tend to reverse within one or two years, our 
measure of accounting conservatism CONSi,t  is averaged over a three-year period centered on the year of interest, 
multiplied by negative 1 (Richardson et al., 2005). Positive values of CONSi,t  indicate greater accounting 
conservatism; BS i,t = the natural logarithm of the total number of directors serving on the board; BI i,t= the 
porportion of independent directors on board (the number of independent directors divided by board size); DUALi,t 
= an indicator variable coded 1 if the same person serves as both CEO and chairperson of the board, and 0 
otherwise; MEETi,t = the natural logarithm of board meeting held per year; ASSIDi,t = the percentage of board 
assiduity; GEND i,t= the percentage of female directors on the board; SIZE i,t= the natural logarithm of total sales; 
LITi,t = an indicator variable coded 1 if the company is classified as a high-ligation risk industry, and 0 otherwise.  
High-litigation industries are firms with SIC codes of 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674,5200-5961, and 7370; 
LISTi,t = a dummy variable, equal to 1 if  the firm has an ADR traded in the U.S. that requires reconciliation to U.S. 
GAAP, and 0 otherwise.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between board attributes and conditional 
accounting conservatism among SBF120 companies during 2009-2012. Six board attributes are investigated, 
namely: board size; board independence; board leadership, gender diversity; board meeting frequency; and board 
attendance. Overall, our results show that board meeting frequency and attendance are positively associated with 
accounting conservatism. Board activities improve board governance, which in turn are likely to improve the 
financial reporting quality in the French context. Second, board size negatively affects conditional accounting 
conservatism. Large boards are associated with less effective monitoring, confused decision-making, and less 
membership coordination (Eisenberg et al., 1998), which can reduce the quality of accounting information. In 
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addition, we find a positive association between gender diversity and conditional accounting conservatism. This 
positive influence suggests that female directorship improves board monitoring, which in turn is likely to require a 
higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. Lastly, in contrast to 
what is expected, board leadership and independence do not appear to have a significant relation with conditional 
accounting conservatism. We checked the robustness of our empirical results by using alternative measures of 
accounting conservatism. 
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